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LEADERSHIP SELECTION IN CANADIAN
INDIAN COMMUNITIES
REFORMING THE PRESENT AND
INCORPORATING THE PAST

]. ANTHONY LONG and MENNO BOLDT

With improving prospects of achieving a
greater measure of political autonomy for their
governments, native Indian leaders in Canada
are heginning to klOk seriously at reforming
internal tribal/band political structures. Their
objectives arc to establish band governments
that meet the present social and economic
needs of Indian peoples as well as reflect
traditional political values. A "hand" is a legal
entity specified in the Indian Act, a federal
statute that has governed Indians in Canada
since shortly after Confederation. In most
instances the band corresponds to traditional
tribal social and political organization, and
these concepts are now often used interchangeahly. '
In attempting to reform band govern-

Professors at the Unit'ersit\, of Lethhridge, J.
Anthon)' Long (political science) and Menno Boldt
(sociolog\) are co-editors tcith Lno) Little Bear of
Pathways to Self-Determination: Canadian
Indians and the Canadian State (I9R4) and
The Quest for Justice: Aboriginal Peoples and
Aboriginal Rights (I9R5).
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ments, Indian leaders face formidahle ohstacles. First, there is a virtual absence of research
on the performance of current hand government systems in the political and administrative spheres. In particular, Indian leaders lack
information on the efficiency and accountahility of their leadership selection processes and
on the operation of their band councils.:
Second, band councils arc derived from EuroCanadian political concepts and structures
that have been imposed by the Indian Act.
Traditional indigenous institutions and practices have been systematically suppressed hy a
succession of Department of Indian Affairs
administrations. Finally, reforms to current
band councils and their electoral systems arc
required to conform to the principles of the
recently enacted Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, which are based upon individualistic western liheral democratic values and, as
such, conflict with much of traditional indigenous political ideology.:
Our purpose in this paper is twofold. First,
using data from band council elections and
information from interviews with Indian leaders, we examine how the processes of leadership selection under the Indian Act elective
system occur on the reserves of the Bloods and
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Peigans, two subtribes of the historical Blackfoot Nation.' (In Canada, lands allocated by
treaty to Indians that fall under the Indian Act
are called "reserves" in contrast to the American term "reservation.") In our analysis we
compare band council elections on the two
reserves with municipal council elections in
three adjacent non-Indian towns, Pincher
Creek, Fort Macleod, and Cardston, Alberta.
The Indian Act elective system is based on the
same ideological principles as the municipal
electoral systems. Thus, the municipal council
elections can serve as useful reference points in
our attempt to understand how the Indian Act
elective system functions within the Blood and
Peigan political systems. Second, employing
the results of this analysis we seek to determine
what impact the Indian Act elective system,
with its associated Euro-Canadian political
values, has had on the traditional leadership
selection practices among the Bloods and
Peigans.
The Blood and Peigan bands are among
the largest and most modern Indian communities in Canada; therefore, we do not claim
that the specific characteristics exhibited in the
operation of their leadership selection systems
are typical of Indian bands across Canada.
However, because nearly all Indian bands in
Canada have elective systems for choosing
band council members our analysis can serve
as a reference point for future studies in this
area.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION

The Blood and Peigan reserves are located
in southern Alberta within Treaty Area ]\0. 7.
They were established in 1883 and 1877,
respectively. The Blood reserve has a population of over 6,000 and, geographically, is the
largest reserve in Canada, comprising nearly
546 square miles. The Peigan reserve covers an
area of approximately 210 square miles and has
a population of slightly over 2,000.
Both the Blood and Peigan band governments receive more than 80 percent of their
annual revenue from the federal government

in the form of funds allocated for specific
purposes. In addition, the band governments
receive a limited amount of income from a
capital trust fund, administered by the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, that contains royalties and other
revenues from natural gas and oil production
on reserve lands. In an effort to generate more
revenue from internal sources and to create
employment opportunities, both bands have
attempted to develop an agricultural and
small-business enterprise based economic infrastructure. The agricultural sector consists of
individual mixed farming and ranch holdings,
communally owned farms and cattle operations, and extensive land leases to neighboring
non-Indian farmers. The small business enterprises currently include a prefabricated home
manufacturing company, clothing manufacturing firms, and arts and crafts outlets.
Despite moves by both bands toward
economic modernization, per capita income
and rates of employment remain far below
those of comparable non-Indian populations.
Unemployment on the two reserves currentlv
averages 75 percent, compared to an average
rate of 9.5 percent for the adjacent municipalities and for Canadians generally. Moreover,
legal strictures imposed by the Indian Act, and
lack of start-up capital, have hindered development of business enterprises on the reserves.
Both bands are experiencing rapid population
growth and, with static land bases, most
younger Indians are forced to live on welfare,
while a few move off the reserves to find
employment.
In the past two decades, both bands have
developed fairly extensive bureaucratic structures, paralleling those of non-Indian municipalities. The emergence of bureaucratic
infrastructures is due, partly, to a policy of the
federal government, beginning in the 19605,
that encouraged transfer of program delivery
control from the Department of Indian Affairs
to "qualified" indi\'idual bands, The de\elopment and elaboration of bureaucratic structures also reflects a deliberate attempt on the
part of the two Indian bands to control and
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manage their own internal affairs in such
critical areas as economic planning, land use,
education, child welfare, and social development.
Of the three adjacent non-Indian towns
that are used in our study, Pincher Creek is
located approximately 15 kilometers west of
the Peigan reserve; Fort Macleod is located
midway between the Blood and Peigan reserves; and Cardston borders the southeastern
end of the Blood reserve. These towns have
populations between 3,000 and 3,500. All
three towns have agrarian based economies
and have socially homogeneous populations,
comprised mainly of retired farmers, small
business owners and their employees, and local
and provincial government workers. Town
revenues are derived from general per capita
and conditional grants from the province,
local property taxes, and licensing and other
fees.

COUNCIL ELECTIVE SYSTEMS

The imposition of the Indian Act elective
system on Indian bands represented a major
initiative by the Canadian government to
"civilize," that is, to assimilate, the Indian
tribes. Because it incorporated the western
liberal democratic concepts of individual political rights, representation, and election by
plurality, the Indian Act elective system was
viewed by the Canadian government as superior to the communal and consensus-based
indigenous political systems. 5 In the words of
Deputy Superintendent of Indian Affairs William Spragge in 1871, the elective system
would substitute "a responsible, for an irresponsible system."o
Within the broad objective of assimilation,
the elective system was intended to accomplish
two goals: first, to indoctrinate Indians into a
Euro-Canadian political culture, thus preparing them, ultimately, to live within local
government systems; and, second, to eliminate
traditional Indian political values, institutions,
and governing processes.; Historically, how-

ever, the elective system has also been used as
an instrument of control in the Canadian
government's general policy of internal colonialism.' Traditional tribal structures often provided centers of resistance to government
Indian policies. For the purpose of controlling
band activities by Indian Affairs, elected band
councils were more cooperative and organizationally more compatible than the traditional
tribal decision-making structures.
Although the Blood and Peigan bands did
not come under the electoral provisions of the
Indian Act formally and fully until 1962,
under the authority of federal government
agents they had begun to operate an embryonic form of this system as early as the 1930s. A
rudimentary, informal elective system was
imposed on both reserves during the interWorld War period when the Department of
Indian Affairs decided to extend the elective
system to prairie reserves. 9 Under the informal
system, councilmen were elected by a show of
hands and chiefs were appointed by a federal
government agent. By the early 1960s, however, under pressure from the Canadian government, the Blood and Peigan bands, along with
other prairie Indian bands, formally and fully
adopted the provisions of the Indian Act band
council elective system.
Section 74 of the Indian Act, which
governs the composition and methods of
selection of band councils, prescribes that each
band can elect one chief and one councillor for
everyone hundred band members, to a
maximum of twelve councillors. Regardless of
the size of the band, at least two councillors
must be chosen. Section 74(3) provides as
follows:
a) that the chief of a band shall be elected
by
i) a majority of the votes of the
electors of the band, or
ii) a majority of the votes of the
elected councillors of the band
from among themselves, but the
chief so elected shall remain a
councillor; and
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b) that the councillors of a band shall he
elected by
i) a majoritv of the votes of the
electors of the band, or
ii) a majority of the votes of the
electors of the band in the
electoral section in which the
candidate resides and that he
proposes to represent on the
council of the hand.
Sections 75 through 80 of the Act allow the
governor in council and the minister to
regulate qualifications of electors, nomination
meetings, voting procedures, and election
appeals. Within these same sections, provisions exist for declaring the office of chief or
councillor vacant and for prescribing circumstances under which elections can be declared
invalid.
In the mid-1970s both the Blood and
Peigan bands sought and were given permission by the Department of Indian Affairs to
conduct their band council elections under the
"custom" provision (2: la) of the Indian Act.
The custom provision allows a band to opt out
of Section 74 and choose its council "according to the custom of the Band." This does not
mean, however, that the Blood and Peigan
bands could revert to their traditional methods of choosing leaders. Rather, the custom
option allows a band to operate its electoral
system differently from the specific requirements of the Indian Act. k Under this provision, the bands were given authority to
exercise control with respect to nominating
and voting procedures, and candidate qualifications. However, the only changes of any
significance actually made by the Blood and
Peigan bands under the custom provision were
the extension of the franchise to band members living off the reserves, and the imposition
of a nomination fee to be assessed all candidates standing for election to band council.
They retained all other provisions of the
Indian Act.
The size and composition of town councils
in the adjacent towns of Pincher Creek, Fort

Macleod, and Cardston, as well as the rules
regulating their election, are specified by the
Alberta Municipal Government Act and the
Alberta Local Authorities Election Act. The
Alberta Municipal Gm'Crnment Act provides
for an elected council of six members, a
separately elected mayor, and a chief administrative officer appointed by the council. The
authority of the chief administrative officer
extends to specific duties assigned by the
council. The Local Authorities Election Act
contains detailed regulations governing town
council and mayoral elections, including voter
and candidate eligibility requirements, limits
on candidate nomination fees, and election
procedures. Although no legal impediments
exist for the promotion of candidates by
political parties in local elections, municipal
politics in Alberta have remained non-partisan.
LEADERSHIP SELECTIli:\ SYSTE~lS

To understand how the Indian Act elective
s\'stem currently operates as a leadership
sciection system on the Blood and Peigan
resenTS we use electoral data from 1965
through 1987 as a starting point for analysis.
Specificallv, we look at candidate participation
rates, voter participation rates, and re-election
of incumbents. \Ve relate this data to comparable ciection data from the three adjacent nonIndian rural communities. While aggregate
election data have limitations for explaining
how leadership selection systems function,
nonetheless they can direct us toward fruitful
areas for examination.
For purposes of analysis \\'e have broken
down the band and town council election data
into the following categories: voter turnout,
number of candidates for chief or mayor,
number of candidates for council, number of
successful incumbents, and percentage of \·otes
GIst to elect the chief or mavor and members of
the counciL" Such a breakdown gives us
electoral data in a form comparable to that
conventionally used to disaggregate and evaluClte elections, Clnd it allO\\'s us to make
compClrisons between band council elections
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aIl e! the c'lenil)!l s in adjacent non-Indian
muni ci palities. (See table 1.) In order to
de termine whether or not imposing a candid me nOln1l1atilln fe e had any effect on voting
,mel C<lnel id al: \ pa rrerm , In: hm'e o rganized the
h an d cou n,il deni on data into pre- and postno mi nation-fcc peri ods.
'\'I{mhn of Cunellelmes and Political Recrultmem . The strikin g ,bpect of b and council
electiuns is the number of candidates standing
for election at both the council and chief
lew k The average numher of candidates
standing for each counci l seat in adjacent
t(1\ln, rard\' exceeds tll'O, and th e norm is
fe\I'er t h an (\1'0 candidates standing for mayor.
Bv clm trast, th e average number of candidates
fur enc h council posi tio n on the Bl ood reserve
Ilib 5.75 during th e pre-nomination-fee period
and 7.00 in the post-nomination-fee period.
A mo ng the Peigaf1S the number of band
cou ncil candidates al't.'rnged 4. 06 and 2.58
rl'spect ivelv. during the same periods. The
average number of candidates for the
'. hiefr ainship on th e Blood reser ve \\'as 6.75 for
th e Im :-nomination-fee-period and 9.00 for the

post-nomination-fee period. For the Peigans
the number of chieftainship candidates aver3ged 5.70 3nd 4.33 respectively, during the
5nme periods.
There is nothing unique about the Indian
An elective system, \\'hen compared to nonIndian municipal electoral systems, that
should produ ce this result. There are no legal
impediments to large numbers of candidates
seeking council seats in non-Indian communities. Wh y then do band council elections
attract so many more candidates than nonIndian local elections? We propose that the
difference derives to a great extent from the
particular ca ndidate recruitment conventions
and processes that exist on both reserves,
I\·hich are quite different from those in the
neighboring non-Indian towns.
The literature on political recruitment
\\'ithin n o n-partisan municipal election systems at the smaller community level points to
the existen ce of screening/ sponsoring mechanisms that serve to limit the number of
candidates in the electoral contest. The screening mechanisms may take the form of civic
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election associations or community, business,
and service organizations, which perform an
informal recruitment function. The role of
these groups usually is to help define the
structure of political opportunity in the sense
of identifying who can compete for electoral
office with a reasonable chance of success. In
other words, relatively extensive involvement
in community, business, or service organizations is generally a prerequisite for a successful
candidacy for town council. I: It is true that
some candidates are self-recruited outside of
the network of community associations, but
these tend to be exceptions to the rule. A
significant characteristic of non-partisan municipal elections, then, is that a pre-election
screening process takes place.
In Blood and Peigan politics, no comparable screening processes and norms have developed to limit the number of candidates
entering the electoral arena. Instead, candidate
selection is influenced by a set of factors
unique to band politics. Our interviews with
leaders in both Indian bands have identified
several factors that influence such a large
number of candidates to enter the electoral
arena. We will briefly discuss these under the
categories: (1) social and cultural factors; (2)
economic and institutional factors; and (3)
electoral behavior.
Social and Cultural Factors. The authors of
the Hawthorn Report, in their study of the
Blood reserve during the 1960s, found that the
principle of "sectional representation," which
corresponded to kinship group representation,
played a significant role in candidate recruitment and voting support on the Blood reserve.
Each kinship group, or "historical band,"
would put forward several candidates for
council seats, and the members of that kinship
group would vote for their relatives. The
pattern of candidates emerging from this
process would result in a more or less equal
number of representatives on the band council
from the various kinship groups. I' The kinship
variable, therefore, was important for Hawthorn and associates in explaining the large
number of candidates that ran under the
1;

Indian Act electoral system.
Although family group members are no
longer geographically grouped on the Blood
resenT because of land allocation and economic development policies, our interviews suggest
that kinship continues to be an explanatory
factor for the large number of candidates in
the Blood and Peigan elections. Family groupings on both reserves, especially wealthier kin
groups, continue to run slates of candidates
during each election to maintain their advantaged status within the tribe. Sponsorship of
candidates usually takes place in informal
family group caucuses, where decisions are
made as to who should run for council and
who should not. The existence of the kinship
group as a recruitment system is reflected in
the candidate lists, where identifiable clusters
of family surnames appear. It is particularly
evident in the chieftainship contests, where
major family groups are represented by at least
one candidate and sometimes two. There arc
no direct parallels to kinship group recruitment structures in non-Indian municipal politics. Non-partisan electoral associations are
generally open, not exclusive, and the numher
of these associations in existence in any given
small town election is far fewer than the
number of family groups running members for
council on Indian reserves.
Kinship sponsored candidate recruitment
as it occurs in today's band elections should
not, however, be equated with traditional
family based leadership selection processes. In
traditional hands, an individual who distinguished himself as a coordinator and facilitator
of collective action rose through the family
structure and, eventually, succeeded to leadership position within the broader trihe.·" He
did not compete with other family group
nominees in a trihal election. Moreover, a
variation of the traditional kinship
sponsorship system has emerged on both
reserves-self-selected candidates who enter
the election contest in the hopes of receiving
votes from their relatives. In other words,
although official "family" sponsorship is not
involved, the individual expects to receive
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family \ocing support.
Economic and Institutional Factors. In their
survey of Indian communities, the authors of
the Hawthorn Report found a strong correlation between the number of candidates for
council positions and the size of band funds.;;
A comparison of the average numbers of
candidates in Blood band elections as compared to Peigan band elections appears to
confirm Hawthorn's finding. The Blood
band's annual budget is several times greater
than that of the Peigan band, and the average
number of Blood council candidates is approximately twice as high as on the Peigan reserve.
Although the implications of this correlation
were given only limited consideration in the
Hawthorn Report, we can suggest two speculative interpretations: one, it may be that
candidates run for council to advance the
common good, that is, the size of band funds
makes it possible for the council to accomplish
something positive for the reserve community;
and two, candidates run for council to take
advantage of band resources for the benefit of
themselves, their relatives, and friends. In
regard to the first suggested interpretation it
,hould be noted that, although the Blood
band controls greater funds than the Peigan
band, both bands are poor by prevailing
Canadian standards. Neither band has sufficient income to provide a level of services to its
members comparable to that existing off the
resen·es. Moreover, because of the high level
of fiscal and political control that the Department of Indian Affairs exercises over band
councils and tribal administration, council
members have little latitude in determining
how band funds are to be spent. The combination of chronic under funding and Indian
Affairs control over how band monies are
spent, makes serving on band council an
experience in frustration rather than of satisfaction gained from advancing the common
good. Band councillors on both reserves have
confirmed this view to us.
Self-interest is a more convincing explanation for whv so many individuals stand for
band council elections. In both tribes council
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seats and chieftainships are defined as full-time
positions. A band councillor's salary, including allowances and benefits, exceeds 520,000
per year on both reserves. Aside from a few
re;erve administrative positions, the councillors' and chief's positions are the highest
paid positions on the reserve. Given the high
rates of unemployment on both reserves, a
council seat represents an extremely attractive
employment opportunity. By comparison,
remuneration for councilmen and mayors in
adjacent non-Indian towns falls between
$3,000 and 54,000 per annum respectively. For
many candidates, then, band council elections
are, in effect, the "politics of self-employment."
Bevond immediate personal financial gain,
moreover, a position on band council represents the opportunity to benefit family and
friends through influence over the decisions on
scarce resources, such as band jobs, services,
and land. In short, leaders on both reserves
have indicated to us that a council post is seen
as a position from which an individual can
directly benefit himself, relatives, and friends.
The large number of candidates running
for office is also related to the conception
Indian people have of the band council as an
institution. The primary function of band
councils has been to serve as an administrative
arm of the Department of Indian Affairs. As a
consequence, band councils are not viewed by
Indians as representative assemblies accountable to band members. This eliminates the
personal accountability factor that tends to
discourage less than serious candidates in nonIndian municipalities from running for office.
Alberta municipalities have always exhibited a
strong sense of local democracy and autonomy. \Vhile municipalities in Alberta exist as
legal creatures of the province, they nevertheless hold substantial discretionary powers
under the Alberta Municipal Government
Act. Under Section 112 of the Act, municipalities are allowed to pass bylaws for "peace,
order and good government," and "for promoting the health, safety, morality and welfare" of their citizens. Historically, the
province has been reluctant to interfere with
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the bylaw-making or discretionary powers of
municipalities, preferring to let local democrac\' pre\'ail and correct its own mistakes when
necessary. The extensive power of municipalities in Alberta, coupled with a local property
tax base that accounts for a large share of
municipal revenue, has created a situation
where citizens demand accountability from
their elected councils. Councillors cannot shift
blame to senior levels of government for bad or
ineffective administration, By contrast, band
councillors can always deflect the dissatisfaction of electors by blaming the Department of
Indian Affairs for lack of accomplishments,
Thus, band councillors are spared some of the
slings and arrows generallv associated with
service on non-Indian municipal councils.
Electoral Behavior. The distribution of votes
among candidates, particularly on the Blood
reserve, tends to give band council elections
the flavor of a game of chance, In nearly all
elections over the period under study the vote
was so thinly distributed amongst candidates
that even a very small shift in voter support
would produce a greatly different election
outcome. For example, in the 1984 Blood band
council election, the bottom four elected
candidates received 'votes of 165, 164, 160, and
160, respectively, The next twenty-seven unsuccessful candidates were not far behind,
receiving between 159 and 100 votes, Our
interviews suggest that elections are viewed by
many candidates as a game in which anyone
might win, This lottery atmosphere serves as
an inducement for many people to stand as
candidates.
Recently, both bands introduced a candidate nomination fee, The nomination fee on
the Blood reserve is $50.00, The Peigans began
with a $75,00 nomination fee but raised it in
the 1987 elections to $200,00 for council
candidacy and $300.00 for the chieftainship,
Tribal leaders hoped that a nomination fee
would cause individuals to think more seriously about running for council as well as reduce
election costs by having fewer candidates, Our
data indicates this tactic appears to be marginally successful on the Peigan reserve where a

reduction in the number of candidates has
occurred since a nmnin,nion fee \\'a, introduced, Caution i, needed, however, in gi\'ing
undue credit w the nomination fcc for the
reduction in the number of candidates in
recent Feigan elecriom. \\'hile a significant
decrease in cmdidates did occur between the
1Y79 and 1981 band council elections when
the S75 fcc wa, introduced, onl\, an 1M percent
drop in the number of candidates for council
wok place in the 1987 elections when the
nomination fee was raised to $2()().OLl. ~v1ore
over, the number of candidates for chief
increased from four to fi\'C in the 1987 election,
despite the quadrupling of the nomination fee.
On the Blood reserve, the number of candidates actually increased by over ten percent
after the imposition of a nomination fee,
suggesting that tribal members may have
reacted negatiwly to attempts bv band leadership to limit their right to stand as council
candidates. Another explanation is that a
nomination fee of $50.00 is roo low to serve as
Cl disincentive, Bv comparison. the Alberta
Local Authorities Election Act sets a limit of
$100.00 for nomination fees in municipalities
with a population under 100,000. The nomination fcc in Cardston, Fort Macleod, and
Fincher Creek, however, is on Iv $25.00.
VoteT Participation. Voter participation
rates are usually treated as indicators not onlv
of citi:en interest in leadership selection, but
arc also a reflection of interest in issues on the
public agenda. During the period under study,
\'Clter participation rates among members of
the Blood and Peigan tribes ~1\'C[aged 51
percent of eligible voters for the Bloods and 58
percent for the Peigans. The Hawthorn study,
conducted during the 1955-1965 period.
,howed a similar voter turnout in the communities they studied. These voter turnout rates
appear comparable to voter participation rmes
during council elections in the neighboring
non-Indian towns, which average 55 percent. (See Table I.) However, a comparison of voter
turnouts between band and municipal council
elections is problematic for two reasons. One.
the voting age on both reserves is 21 years
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comp<1red to 18 years in municipal elections.
And two, the high rates of poverty and social
pathology on the reserves make interpretmion
of Indian voter turnout difficult. A more
meaningful comparison would be to relate
present levels of participation by tribal memhers in the leadership selection process under
the Indian Act election system to participation
under the traditional system of leadership
selection. Under the traditional system leaders
emerged from a consensual process with virtuallv all adults participating. Under the
elective system many tribal members do not
participate in the leadership selection process
and are pushed to the periphery of decisionmaking.
Re-Election of Incumbents. Re-election rates
among Blood and Peigan councillors are much
lower than those in the neighboring communities. In the non-Indian communities turnover of council membership usually results
from decisions by incumbents not to run
again. Except in Cardston, of those incumbents who stand for office again, over half are
re-elected. On the two Indian reserves, however, our data indicate that most incumbent
turnover is incurred by electoral defeat rather
than by decisions on the part of council
members not to run again for office. The high
level of incumbent electoral defeat is, in part,
attributable to the fact that a small shift in
voter support is likely to result in an incumbent's being defeated. More significantly,
however, the limited authority and lack of
funds at a band council's disposal means it is
simply not <1ble to satisfy the expectations of
band members and this diss<1tisfaction is
expressed in a lack of elector loyalty to
incumbents. Interestingly, our interviews re\'eal that the low incumbent re-election rates
do not reflect, except in isolated cases, a
"thro\\' the rascals out" attitude. In general,
elections on both reserves have not been
characterized by deliberate efforts among
groups of band members to prevent the reelection of specific individuals. Unlike the
to\\'l1 council elections in which councillors are
held accountable for the state of the munici-

III

palitv, in the band elections b<1nd members are
aware of the very limited influence that their
council members exert over the events and
circumstances that affect their lives.
The cumulative effect of so many incumbents being defeated results in unstable band
councils. Nearly two-thirds of council membership changes every two years, leaving little
scope for long range social and economic
planning. A majority of councilmen have to be
educated every two years about on-going
policy initiatives and even about procedures of
council. Both bands have lost opportunities
for job-producing economic development because of inexperienced council members and
instability.
The incumbency of band chiefs, however,
reflects a very different pattern of electoral
behavior than that evident in band council
elections. As a rule, chiefs on both reserves
stay in office for much longer periods-ranging
from six to fourteen years-and, over the
period of our study, only one had been voted
out of office. Chiefs, then, are more directly
comparable to the mayors of the adjacent nonIndian towns with respect to tenure in office.
Our interviews with Indian leaders suggest
that the more stable incumbency patterns of
chiefs is due to the fact that the tribal
chieftainship still retains much of its traditional symbolic meaning for band members. That
is, the chieftainship is perceived as a stabilizing
and unifying institution for the tribe internally
and as the formal representative of the tribe
externally. In fact, however, a contemporary
chief is nearly as powerless as the band council
members.
THE I~1PACT OF THE Ii\DIAN ACT ON
TRADITIONAL RECRUITMENT PROCESSES

Our findings regarding the way the Indian
Act elective system operates on the Blood and
Peigan reserves inform our second purpose: to
discover how the Indian Act elective system,
which is based upon Euro-Canadian values,
has had an impact on traditional Indian
leadership selection practices.
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Ideologically, the Indian Act elective system is based upon a contractarian concept of
individual political rights, universal eligibility
for political office, and the notion of formal
representation. The leadership selection process embodied in this system involves the
selection of a set of decision-makers at definite
intervals, the delegation of decision-making
authority to these individuals (including the
acceptance of the corollary obligation to be
bound by that authority), and the right to
change the decision-makers at the next election. Underlying this process are the assumptions that the plurality system governs the
operation of the electoral system in choosing
representatives and that the decision-making
process within the representative body will be
by majority rule. A basic premise is that
representatives are accountable to those who
elect them.
For the Blood and Peigan bands the
traditional leadership selection process, as well
as the delegation of authority, was grounded in
the concepts of communalism, egalitarianism,
and consensus. In practice, this meant that
power, or authority, could not be claimed by
any subset of the tribe. It was vested in the
tribe as a whole and only delegated on a
temporary basis. I, There was no fixed number
of leaders; chiefs were chosen on the basis of
their functional skills for leadership related to
a particular task. In times of peril the band
would turn to a warrior for leadership but as
soon as the danger had passed his status
reverted to that of just another band member. i" In all cases, leadership selection involved
extensive consultation among members and
families of the Indian community. Traditional
Indian leadership was essentially a meritocracy, and good people were able to rise to
influence through the family and clan, eventually becoming members of the tribal council.:' Government without institutionalized
ruling structures required special procedures.
For the Blood and Peigan bands, those procedures included direct participation in leadership selection, and decision-making by
consensus. 21

How have the two distinctly different
leadership selection systems interacted? In one
sense, it can be argued that as an externally
imposed institutional arrangement, the Indian
Act band council elective system has contributed to the destruction of the traditional
meritocratic leadership selection of the Blood
and Peigan bands. A leadership selection
system that is based upon individualized
political rights and participation, that allows
virtually unlimited entry into the leadership
selection arena because of the absence of
effecti ve candidate screening/sponsoring
mechanisms, and allows for the election of
council members by small pluralities is inimical
to the traditional system that stressed collective agreement in the choosing of leaders and
decision-making by consensus.
In another sense, however, the malfunction of the Indian Act elective system can be
seen as the consequence of two major handicaps that have historically plagued Indian
government in Canada: lack of effective internal governing authority and a concomitant
lack of accountability to tribal members.
Under the Indian Act, the authority of band
governments has been reduced to by-law
making bodies of the sort that "control bee
keeping and the destruction of noxious
weeds." Historically, the most significant powers of the Blood and Peigan band governments
have been control of internal land allocation
decisions. Moreover, the Indian Affairs policy
of supporting band government through earmarked funds and the imposition of strict
financial accounting procedures has in effect
meant that program development and corresponding funding priorities on the reserves
have been determined by non-Indians rather
than by band leadership. By incorporating
band governments into the hierarchical structure of Indian Affairs, with its upward flow of
administrative and financial accountability,
the traditional Indian stress on the responsibility of leaders to the tribe has been undermined.
A leadership selection process that results
in political incumbents who are characterized
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bv lack of power and the absence of accountabilitv to constituents serves as a fertile ground
for economic egoism. In the case of the Blood
and Peigan band council elections, economic
egoism is reflected in the large number of
candidates whose motivation in running for
band council is self-interest and pecuniary
gain. jv1oreO\'er, the long history of being
accountable to Indian Affairs has produced a
habitual incapacity among band councillors to
\'iew their primary responsibilities as being to
their constituents. On the other side of the
coin, band members have lost the initiative to
demand accountability from their elected
representati ves.
The Canadian government must accept
primary responsibility for the deficiencies in
the Indian Act elective system as it now
operates on the Blood and Peigan reserves. By
its refusal to incorporate the basic value of
accountability into the leader-constituent
relationships on the reserves, the Canadian
govemment has precluded the development of
responsive, responsible, and stable forms of
Indian government. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Indian Act elective system does
not function on reserves as do its counterparts
in non-Indian communities.

CcJ;\CLl;SIOl"

There appears to be no turning back from
the elective sYstem as the basis of band
gO\·ernment. The acculturation of tribal members to the elective system and the guarantee of
democratic political rights under the Charter,
\\hich legally precludes any form of leadership
selection based on non-elective methods, ensures that some form of elective system for
band council will remain in existence. Nevertheless, significant reforms can be made by
Indi,m bands. The preceding analysis of band
council elections suggests that if viable selfgo\'ernment is to develop on Indian reserves,
Indian leaders must direct their attention to
making the present band councils, or whatever
type of legislative assembly that emerges, more

res~xmsive to the needs and demands of their
constituents.
First, the direction of accountability needs
to be reversed. This process can begin by
increasing the internal authority of band
government, either constitutionally or legislatively. If the federal government is unwilling
to do this then bands must do it through their
own initiative. As band governments become
a stronger political force within their communities, their dependency on the Department of
Indian Affairs will lessen and the present
situation, characterized by upward accountability, will decrease. Band councils may then
become more like their counterparts in the
adjacent non-Indian towns where a highly
developed sense of political accountability
exists on the part of council members toward
their constituents. But, making band governments responsive and accountable to tribal
members is also a matter of attitudinal change
amongst both leaders and followers. Band
government will not achieve greater internal
authority un1css support is firmly rooted in the
tribe itself. If the Bloods and Peigans are to use
their governments as effective political instruments for self-government, a major reorientation is required for both leaders and followers.
This constitutes a task of great magnitude. As
autonomous and responsive Indian government becomes a reality, economic self-interest
may diminish as a primary motive for political
participation, and individuals whose first aim
is to serve the needs of their people will run for
council.
Second, the retention of the band council
elective system does not preclude efforts by
Indian leaders to search for creative ways to
bring the values associated with their traditional ways of choosing leaders into the
modern political process. For example, the
establishment of a ward system, which is
permissible under the present Indian Act,
could bring the electoral process closer to the
people and increase the feeling of personal
participation in the leadership selection process. Another significant effect of having
smaller electoral districts would be to place

114 GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY, SPRING 1987

councillors in a closer relationship to their
constituents. Dialogue could be increased, and
councillors would be in a better position to
understand and react to constituents' needs.
Moreover, a carefully designed ward system
would be more compatible with traditional
kinship selection and representative practices.
Third, the leadership on both reserves
should seriously consider eliminating (or reducing to a token amount) the candidate
nomination fee for band council elections as a
device to limit the number of candidates. The
nomination fee is a response to problems
created by an imposed leadership selection
system and has no basis in traditional Blackfoot political culture. Rather, it is inimical to
the traditional meritocratic leadership selection method. Moreover, a nomination fee,
particularly on the Peigan reserve, has the
potential of not only being a formidable
barrier to those of lower economic and social
standing who wish to run for a council seat,
but also of creating a self-perpetuating, classbased, governing elite.
Fourth, the problem of band council
instability could be partly addressed by lengthening the term of office from the present two
years to four years. This change is possible
under the custom provisions of the Indian Act
under which both bands now operate. A fouryear term would allow councillors to gain
experience and knowledge. Under the present
two-year term they have only one year to gain
experience before they become "lame ducks."
During the last year of their term, their
decisions are made in the context of the
"anticipated reactions" of tribal members in
the next election. The four-year term is more
conducive to long-range economic and social
planning. Four years could provide the time
necessary to develop policies as well as provide
an opportunity to monitor their implementation.
Finally, in addition to initiating changes in
the band council elective system, tribal leaders
could establish institutions that more directly
reflect their traditional philosophies and values. For example, constituting a Council of

Elders to advise the band council could bring
additional wisdom and experience into the
decision-making process and, at the same time,
preserve important cultural traditions among
the Blackfoot. Such a complementary political
structure could help restore a degree of consensual decision-making by bringing more tribal
members out of the periphery and into the
decision-making process. Tribal institutions
that reflect, even in part, traditional political
ideals are more likely to engender the loyalty
of their constituents, an essential ingredient
for effective government.
NOTES

1. Both the Blood and Peigan Indians refer to
themselves as tribes as well as bands.
2. Despite the growing body of literature available on Indians in the constitutional, policy-making, and legal areas, little research has been devoted
to the political process within Indian communities.
Other than the comprehensive Hawthorn Report
(H. B. Hawthorn, ed., A Survey of the Contemporary
Indians of Canada: Economic, Political, Educational
~'eeds and Policy, 2 volumes, Ottawa: Indian Affairs
Branch, 1967), few studies exist. See C. H. Torok,
"Structures and Functions in T yendinaga Politics,"
Anthropologica 14 (1972): 31-42. Other tangential
but informative works include Ernest L. Schusky,
ed., Political Organization of ';\latit'e ';\lorth Americans
(Washington, D.C.: University Press of America,
1980); and A. Tanner, ed., The Politics of lndianness
(St. John's, Newfoundland: Memorial University,
1983).
3. For an extensive discussion of the conflict
between traditional Indian political values and the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms see Menno Boldt
and ]. A. Long, "Tribal Philosophies and the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms," Ethnic
and Racial Swdies 7 (1984): 478-93.
4. The only systematic research on band council elections in Canada is contained in Chapter 8,
Part II of the Hawthorn Report. While the Hawthorn study contains insightful analyses and obser\'ations of how band council elections operate
across Canada, it has significant limitations today.
The Hawthorn study was conducted when the 1951
Indian Act electoral system had been in place for
only a short time on a number of reserves, and it is
questionable whether those electoral systems had
been in place long enough for any significant
conclusions to be drawn regarding their operation.
lv1oreover, Hawthorn and his colleagues could not
foresee the social, educational, and other demogra-
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